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rector of the National Institute of Justice.
The second section of the article dusts off the Tripwire proposal, suggests that it now include all illicit drugs, and puts it at the center of the criminal justice system (CJS) efforts in the 1990s to cut the link between illicit drug use and crime. The potential beneficiaries are many, including drug-abusing criminal offenders themselves, their families, and communities. In addition, an updated Tripwire proposal offers hope to the criminal justice system, which is now being crushed by the load of drug-involved offenders. Most important of all, a new Tripwire proposal offers hope to the communities hardest hit by illicit drug abuse, communities made unlivable by drugs, especially poor urban communities.
The social institutions having the broadest and most powerful impact in these communities are the schools, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and the criminal justice system. If these communities are to rid themselves of the modern plague of drug abuse, these institutions offer the greatest hope. Because of the higher levels of controversy surrounding the schools and Aid to Families with Dependent Children, when it comes to effective antidrug efforts,1 the last best chance for these communities to end the two-decade-long drug abuse epidemic lies with the CJS. The CJS has the most direct impact on the youths at highest risk, teenagers and young adults engaging in criminal behavior. The Tripwire proposal is powerful medicine to help solve this problem in these besieged communities.
Finally, the third section of the article focuses on the general problems of research and policy in the criminal justice system, using the issue of drug testing in the criminal justice system as a model for this broader perspective.
DRUGS AND CRIME, 1977
The modern American experience with drugs and crime dates from the late 1960s, when there was a dramatic upsurge in the rates of crime and illicit drug use throughout the country, despite the widespread economic prosperity at the time and despite the major funding then taking place for community development and poverty programs.2 Washington, D.C., at a time when it was a federal city not yet governed by home rule, was a focus of unique concern. The city was labeled in the 1968 presidential election as the "crime capital" of the nation.
Hallucinogens were widely used by American youths for the first time in the late 1960s, especially on the nation's most prestigious campuses, with their effects being glorified as "consciousness expansion" by Timothy Leary, the Harvard professor, and other pied pipers of drug abuse. Marijuana use soon surpassed hallucino- gen use as illicit drug use spread to all segments of America's youths. 3 The federal role in drug abuse at that time was more or less limited to research on opiates and to law enforcement targeted on drug trafficking.4 The federal research interest was centered in Lexington, Kentucky, where the government's small research-oriented treatment program for addicts had been located since the 1930s on the remarkable assumption that taking addicts out of large cities into the fresh air of the "narcotics farm" would help them kick their habits. The Addiction Research Center (ARC) at Lexington was not only the source for virtually all non-law-enforcement federal drug abuse activities but a major foundation on which the National Institute for Mental Health, the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, and the NIDA were built. Until the late 1960s, ARC was virtually the only place in the world where biological research on addiction took place.
ARC was the place where a distinguished physician-researcher, George E. Vaillant, got his start by establishing, with a follow-up of 100 addicts released from Lexington, that the best prognosis for addicts' achieving prolonged abstinence occurred not with prolonged incarceration but with short periods of incar-ceration followed by intensive and prolonged supervision in the community with reincarceration being the swift consequence of return to illicit drug use.5 This pioneering research supported the development of the civil commitment programs in New York and California and a much smaller program in the federal government, created by the Narcotics Addiction Rehabilitation Act, begun in 1967.6
In August 1969, a group of college students working within the District of Columbia Department of Corrections tested the urine of people recently incarcerated. They found that 45 percent tested positive for heroin use. A self-report questionnaire administered to these arrestees showed that their heroin use had begun within the previous three years and that the rate of new heroin use was directly correlated with the rate of serious crime in the city.7
From 1965 on, methadone maintenance treatment became more widely used in New York City under the leadership of physician-researchers Vincent Dole and Marie Nyswander. In Chicago, a brilliant young research physician, Jerome Jaffe, created the multimodality drug abuse treatment concept in which a central publicly funded treatment program offered a spectrum of treatment options, including both methadone detoxification and methadone maintenance, as well as a variety of drug-free treatments, especially the therapeutic community.8
The newer forms of treatment for addiction, therapeutic communities and methadone maintenance, focused on heroin addicts. Neither approach was primarily dependent on civil commitment, an idea that was eclipsed, even in California and New York, where it was most fully developed, by the early 1970s. Civil commitment programs were found to be expensive and difficult to administer. They were overwhelmed by the rising rates of heroin addiction, which pumped ever larger numbers of addicts into already underfunded facilities. Robins found that 88 percent of the servicemen who had been addicted to heroin while in Vietnam had not been addicted at any time during the three years after their return. Furthermore, even among those who reported heroin addiction during their first year back in the United States after leaving Vietnam, 70 percent were not addicted at any time during the following two years. These stunning findings went to the heart of two other common misconceptions in the drug abuse field: (1) that most people who were once addicted to heroin stayed addicted for the rest of their lives; and (2) that the only way to end heroin addiction was by using drug abuse treatment.23 This study raised In the formative years of the contemporary federal drug abuse prevention program, the link between drug use and serious crime was a controversial issue. While the first focus of national concern about drugs was on heroin addiction and related inner-city crime, the drug issue rapidly evolved to focus on the unprecedented rises in marijuana use within the far larger middle class. Pot smoking was not obviously crime related. In the 1970s there was a broadly based effort to normalize the use of marijuana, seeking to treat it similarly to alcohol and tobacco. For this pro-pot movement to prosper, it was essential to unhook illicit drug use and crime except to the extent that marijuana sale and use were themselves criminal offenses. In the logic of those years, the application of criminal penalties to marijuana use was seen as a miscarriage of justice.
In the early 1970s, the most effective form of drug treatment appeared to be methadone maintenance for heroin addiction. In the 1975 federal drug strategy, attempting to respond to the already waning public support for government-sponsored drug programs, there was a commitment to accommodating the conflicting forces then shaping federal policy by refocusing federal efforts on those aspects of illicit drug use that created the greatest social costs.24 This meant focusing on overdose deaths and serious crime and ignoring marijuana and cocaine. The latter were then widely considered to be soft drugs, in contrast to heroin, the prototypical hard drug. The heart of this strategy was to focus on crime and heroin addiction, the bedrock of the support for the federal drug program.25 A central programmatic expression of this strategy was Operation Tripwire, proposed 1 October 1977 by the director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, Robert L. DuPont, in a speech at the annual meeting of the Federal Bar Association in Washington, D.C.
The larger objective of the Tripwire proposal was to help heroin addicts themselves overcome their deadly habit by using the power of the criminal justice system. The proposal established a systematic link between the criminal justice system and drug abuse treatment. Tripwire was also designed to relieve the crushing cost to the criminal justice system caused by the heroin epidemic, and, even more important, it was intended to help reclaim families and communities being torn apart by 24 The Tripwire proposal can be divided into three areas: screening, supervision, and the consequences for positive drug tests. The screening area had two parts. First, all parolees and probationers, regardless of their conviction offense or history of drug or alcohol abuse, would have their urine tested for heroin use on an unannounced basis "once or twice a year." Second, all offenders released from incarceration would be given physical examinations looking for track marks indicating past intravenous drug use, and they would be interviewed and their records reviewed for evidence of past heroin use.
In terms of supervision, offenders identified by either means, routine screening or screening at release from a correctional institution, as having a history of heroin use would be subject to regular urine monitoring, with clean urines being a requirement for continued freedom in the community. They would all be subject to monthly or more frequent unannounced drug testing.
As to consequences for positive drug tests, offenders producing a positive drug test for heroin while under routine CJS supervision would be placed in more intensive supervision with "weekly or more frequent urine tests." If a second urine drug test were positive, the offenders would be required to enter treatment but would be left free to select the modality of treatment they preferred. Repeated failure of the drug test while under supervision would lead to "prompt reincarceration" that would be for "three to six months," followed by release to the community with continued intensive supervision including regular unannounced urine tests. The Tripwire proposal fell on deaf ears in the criminal justice system, the drug abuse treatment community, and the federal government. The heroin epidemic that had so rattled the country at the end of the Meanwhile, a quiet revolution was taking place in drug abuse treatment. As local, state, and federal funding fell for public treatment programs, which had been dominated since the late 1960s by methadone treatment and therapeutic communities, the initiative for innovation shifted to the private sector. The Minnesota Model was developed in the 1970s and was widely applied throughout the nation in the 1980s. This was a privately funded 28-day residential treatment program using the disease concept of addiction and relying heavily on the 12-step programs based on Alcoholics Anonymous.37 This movement revolutionized drug abuse treatment, making it far more successful than it had ever been before. Like the Parents' Movement, the Minnesota Model was largely unconnected to governmental activities, to research, or to the urban Tripwire did not fit the more permissive approach to drugs of the Carter administration. Carter and his White House drug czar were supporting the decriminalization of marijuana. They were also tolerant of the recreational use of cocaine. A tough approach to criminal heroin addicts did not find favor with either Carter or Califano. Since the Tripwire proposal lacked a powerful political constituency and came at a time when the media had grown tired of drug stories, the Tripwire idea died at birth. The drug budget in those years was shrinking, not expanding, so a new and potentially expensive idea was not quickly adopted. This same situation is occurring today as the drug budgets are looked at increasingly to reduce costs rather than to add new programs. The fact that Tripwire promised to cut costs in the CJS profoundly over the long haul held little appeal to executive and legislative staffs attuned to the impact of a proposal on the current year's budget. In the late 1970s, after the exaggerated claims for social programs in the 1960s, they had grown cynical about promises of long-term returns on social program investments.
Can Tripwire now be revived in a new, updated form? Earlier experience suggests this will be a difficult sale, regardless of the research evidence that this targeted approach within the criminal justice system is the right thing to do from many points of view, including both budgetary and humanitarian concerns. There are today, as there were in 1977, many good reasons to support the Tripwire idea. It helps those drug abusers who are the neediest and those creating the highest social costs. A revived Tripwire would be especially beneficial to the communities hardest hit by the current drug epidemic, the poorest urban communities. A revived Tripwire offers the best hope of cutting the size of CJS populations, including those in expensive jails and prisons. Tripwire harnesses the newly improved technology and lowered cost of drug testing. Especially were a new Tripwire to be linked to hair testing, with the latter's 90-day surveillance window, compared to the 3-day window for urine testing, it could be a powerful new weapon in the war against drugs.
But the resistance to the Tripwire concepts are many and enduring. There are two primary reasons for pessimism, the first being the lack of high-level sponsorship. The Tripwire idea would have to be picked up by the drug czar or even the President to be certain of getting a trial. Alternatively, the secretary of health and human services or the attorney general could provide effective sponsorship, and the heads of the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the National Institute of Justice could be effective parents as well. Lower-level sponsorship is unlikely to move the largely immobile bureaucracies in either the criminal justice or the drug abuse fields. Congressional sponsorship of a new Tripwire would be useful but a double-edged sword at any time, given the inescapable conflicts between the legislative and executive branches of government. These conflicts are virtually insurmountable when the two branches of government are controlled by different political parties. If a powerful Democratic committee chairperson were to pick up the Tripwire idea during the administration of a Republican President, it would meet with little enthusiasm and much resistance from all executive branch officials.
One possible solution to this dismal problem can be gleaned from the experience of SAODAP twenty years ago. Under the leadership of Jerome Jaffe, a scientist with impeccable credentials, that agency made great strides in the use of research to guide national drug policy. Perhaps a return to the tradition of appointing scientists experienced in substance abuse research to lead the country's drug policy agency would help promote new, more effective ideas. Such a person could marshal the resources to launch a revised Tripwire program and other innovative programs.
The experience with Jerome Jaffe at SAODAP and with James K. Stewart at the National Institute of Justice, as well as with many other leaders who initiated major new programs in the drug and crime field, demonstrates that successful leaders may or may not be scientists but must be open to the lessons of science and then have the personal qualities necessary to organize these lessons into coherent, practical programs. Successful leaders identify personally with these new programs and carry them through the long, painful, and uncertain gauntlet of politics, budget review, and bureaucratic resistance to become, ultimately, the new foundation on which future innovation can be built. Such leaders are rare and precious in this and in other fields. Whether scientists themselves or not, it is clear today that leaders are most likely to succeed when they marshal a convincing body of scientific evidence and a substantial number of scientific leaders to help them
